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O P I N I O N                    
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Robert Pawlowski appeals both his conviction of one 
count of attempted enticement of a minor, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2422(b), and the sentence imposed by the District 
Court.  Pawlowski raises three arguments:  (1) the 
government‟s remark that defense counsel would “certainly 
present evidence” violated his Fifth Amendment rights, (2) 
the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he believed 
he was communicating with a minor, and (3) the District 
Court miscalculated his Sentencing Guidelines range because 
masturbation does not constitute “sexual contact” for the 
purpose of the two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2G1.3(b)(4)(A).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm 
the judgments of conviction and of sentence of the District 
Court. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND  
 A.  The Crime 
 In the spring of 2009, Detective Lynn Havelka of the 
Allegheny County District Attorney‟s Office was involved in 
an online undercover investigation into crimes against 
children.  As part of the investigation, Detective Havelka 
created an online profile under the name “Ashley Anthony” 
on myYearbook, a social networking website.  Detective 
Havelka posed as a 15-year-old girl.  Because certain features 
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of myYearbook, such as chatting, were restricted to 
individuals 18 years of age or older, Detective Havelka listed 
“Ashley‟s” age as 98.  Detective Havelka chose 98 because 
no one would believe that a 98-year-old used myYearbook 
and “it would give an opportunity to an individual to ask me 
how old I am.”   
 
 Pawlowski first contacted “Ashley” on April 27, 2009, 
with a “friend” request via myYearbook.  After “Ashley” 
accepted, Pawlowski inquired: “I know you are not 98.  How 
old are you, if I may be so forward in asking?”  “Ashley” 
responded that she was 15 years old and in high school.  
Pawlowski then asked:  “Why did you put 98 on your 
profile?”  “Ashley” explained that she wanted to be able to 
chat with her friends on myYearbook.   
 
 Frequent communications between Pawlowski and 
“Ashley” soon followed via myYearbook, Yahoo Instant 
Messenger, and Yahoo email.  The communications were 
recorded by Detective Havelka.  Pawlowski quickly raised 
sexual topics and continued to do so throughout the month 
and a half that he contacted “Ashley.”  Detective Havelka, 
with the aid of a voice changer device to sound like a younger 
girl, also spoke as “Ashley” with Pawlowski via cellular 
telephone.   
 
 After their first phone conversation on May 15, 2009, 
Pawlowski expressed his desire to meet “Ashley” in person.  
During an online conversation on May 24, 2009, Pawlowski 
masturbated in front of “Ashley” on his webcam.  A few days 
later, Pawlowski and “Ashley” discussed arrangements to 
meet in person, including whether he should buy condoms.  
The morning of May 28, 2009, “Ashley” called Pawlowski to 
5 
 
confirm their plan to meet at 9:30 a.m. at the Waterfront in 
Homestead, Pennsylvania.  When Pawlowski appeared at the 
specified time and place, he was arrested.  A search warrant 
was obtained and executed on his residence later that day.    
 
 On June 24, 2009, a one-count Indictment was 
returned, charging Pawlowski with attempted enticement of a 
minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
1
  Pawlowski pled 
not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial.   
 
 B.  The Trial 
 During the three-day jury trial, the government called 
two witnesses:  Detective Havelka and FBI Special Agent 
Ignace Ertilus.  The defense did not call any witnesses.  
Pawlowski was found guilty.   
                                                 
1
 Section 2422(b) provides: 
Whoever, using the mail or any 
facility or means of interstate or 
foreign commerce, or within the 
special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States 
knowingly persuades, induces, 
entices, or coerces any individual 
who has not attained the age of 18 
years, to engage in prostitution or 
any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a 
criminal offense, or attempts to do 
so, shall be fined under this title and 
imprisoned not less than 10 years or 
for life. 
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1.  The Government’s Remark 
 Following empanelment, the District Court gave the 
jury preliminary instructions which explained, inter alia, the 
burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the 
purpose of opening statements, including that “opening 
statements are not evidence.”  In particular, the District Court 
stated:  
After the government has presented 
all the evidence it intends to present, 
the defendant‟s attorney may make 
an opening statement if he has not 
already done so.  Then he may or 
may not present evidence on behalf 
of the defendant.  And the reason 
that I say he may or may not is 
because the defendant is not required 
to present any evidence.  I remind 
you he is presumed innocent and it is 
the government‟s burden and the 
government‟s duty alone to prove the 
guilt of the defendant, and that proof 
must be beyond a reasonable doubt.  
A defendant, this defendant, does not 
have to prove that he is innocent.   
 
 During the government‟s opening, the prosecutor 
stated to the jury:  
 
Mr. Pawlowski is absolutely entitled 
to a fair trial, and he will have a fair 
trial.  Please remember that the 
burden of proof is on the 
prosecution, as it should be, in a 
criminal case.  And [defense 
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counsel] Mr. DeRiso will certainly 
present evidence and explain 
things and bring up, make good 
points that will help you understand 
the evidence better.   
 
 (emphasis added).  No objection was made to this or to any 
part of the government‟s opening statement.  Instead, at the 
end of defendant‟s opening statement, defense counsel 
remarked:  
 
Now, Mr. Prosecutor Haller, excuse 
me, Assistant United States 
Attorney, indicated that I am going 
to put evidence on, and I am sure 
that was a misstatement.  I have no 
duty to put any evidence on.  Trust 
me, there will be some zealous cross-
examination, however, and I am 
going to submit to you all of the 
evidence is right here.  It is the chats.  
It is the phone conversations.  What 
other evidence is there?  The 
government wants you to look at the 
evidence and believe this.  Defense 
wants you to look at the evidence 
and believe this.  It is that simple.   
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The defendant did not object to the government‟s opening 
statement, request a curative instruction from the District 
Court, or move for a mistrial.   
 
 At the close of the evidence, the District Court gave 
final instructions to the jury, which explained that Pawlowski 
had a constitutional right not to testify and reiterated, in part: 
 
The burden of proof is always on the 
government and it must prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  This 
burden never shifts to a defendant 
because the law never imposes upon 
a defendant in a criminal case the 
burden of calling any witnesses or 
producing any evidence.   
 
2. The Age of the “Victim” 
 At trial, the recorded communications between 
Pawlowski and “Ashley” were entered into evidence and 
extensive portions were read aloud, including discussions of 
“Ashley‟s” age and appearance in photographs.   
 
 In their first conversation, on April 27, 2009, 
Pawlowski asked “Ashley” directly about her age and learned 
that she was 15 years old.  Later in the same conversation, 
Pawlowski told “Ashley” not to tell anyone that they chatted 
because “I could get in trouble, you know, under-age.”  When 
“Ashley” said she worked in order to earn money to buy 
clothes, Pawlowski responded: “[h]igh school girls don‟t need 
clothes.”   Throughout the month that they corresponded, 
Pawlowski made numerous remarks indicating he believed 
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“Ashley” to be 15 years old.  He asked when she would be 
turning 16 years old and commented: “Dam[n], I wish you 
was three years older.  Laugh out loud.  Then you would be 
legal.”  He repeatedly called her “young lady” and warned her 
not to drink or do drugs.  He referred to their “age gap” and 
“age diff” and described himself as an “old dude” and 
“older.”  When “Ashley” wondered whether her age bothered 
him, Pawlowski responded no, saying: “You think if we was 
to meet that I would look at you as a 15 immature, young 
lady, or something, you know, age issue?”  “Ashley” also 
reinforced her age by repeating it, such as “I‟m 15.  
Remember,” and by referring to age-related events, such as 
going to high school and learning to drive.   
 
 In addition, Pawlowski repeatedly expressed concern 
that he could get into trouble because of “Ashley‟s” age.  He 
told “Ashley” he preferred that she not tell anyone about their 
contact so that “we don‟t run into any probs.”  He later 
explained:   
 
 Pawlowski:  The reason I seem to be 
dancing around subjects from the 
whatevers and have you confused is 
that this is the internet and there are 
sting operations for older guys 
hitting, trying to pick up younger 
females, and I was just being careful.  
I just don‟t want any trouble with 
anyone.  You know what I mean?  
There, it‟s all out now. 
 
 “Ashley”:  I know what you mean. 
 
Pawlowski:  I know I am a lot older.  
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Just don‟t want you to think, think 
me as a perve.  I am not by far.  I just 
want you to know that.   
 
 Photographs of “Ashley” from her my Yearbook profile 
were also introduced into evidence.  The photographs actually 
depicted a female police officer at ages 13, 15, and 16.   After 
seeing the photographs, Pawlowski expressed his desire to meet 
“Ashley” in person and asked her to send him more pictures.   
 
C.  The Sentencing 
 
Pawlowski faced a mandatory minimum of ten years 
imprisonment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).  The 
Probation Office determined that Pawlowski had a total 
offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, 
resulting in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 121 
to 150 months.  That calculation included a two-level 
enhancement for “sexual contact” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2G1.3(b)(4)(A) because of Pawlowski‟s masturbation via 
webcam transmitted to “Ashley.”  The term “sexual contact,” 
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) and incorporated into 
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3, means:  
 
the intentional touching, either directly or through the 
clothing, of the genitalia . . . of any person with an 
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person. 
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  Pawlowski objected to that enhancement, contending 
that touching oneself does not constitute the touching “of any 
person.”   
 
 At the sentencing hearing on September 30, 2010, the 
District Court rejected Pawlowski‟s objection, finding that 
“the Defendant touching his penis, masturbating while 
interacting with who he believed was a 15-year-old girl, 
qualifies as sexual contact as defined in the statute.”  The 
District Court, therefore, applied the two-level enhancement 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) and sentenced 
Pawlowski to 121 months‟ imprisonment, to be followed by 
25 years of supervised release.   
 
 Pawlowski appealed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Government’s Remark 
 
 Pawlowski argues that the government‟s opening 
remark that defense counsel “will certainly present evidence” 
constitutes an indirect prosecutorial comment on his failure to 
testify, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.  Because 
Pawlowski did not preserve the issue, we review for plain 
error.  United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 
1996).  A plain error is “clear” or “obvious” and “affects 
substantial rights,” meaning it was “prejudicial in that it 
affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings.”  
United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).  
The defendant must demonstrate “that the prosecutor‟s 
remarks were improper, that they denied him a fair trial, and 
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
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different absent the improper statements.”  United States v. 
DeSilva, 505 F.3d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 2007).  
     
 The Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the 
prosecution on the accused‟s silence or instruction by the 
court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”  Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).  A prosecutor‟s 
comment constitutes reversible error only if it “was of such 
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it 
to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.”  
Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1544 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
making that determination, the challenged remark is 
examined in its trial context.  Id.   
 
 Taken in its trial context, the government‟s brief and 
isolated remark does not amount to plain error.  The District 
Court repeatedly explained to the jury that the government 
bore the burden of proof and that Pawlowski had an absolute 
constitutional right not to testify or present evidence.  
Defense counsel directly responded to the government‟s 
remark in his own opening statement, correcting any potential 
misimpression the jury might have had.  Moreover, the 
evidence of Pawlowski‟s guilt was overwhelming, and the 
outcome of the proceeding was unlikely to have been 
different absent the remark.  Any error, therefore, was not 
plain.   
 
B. The Age of the “Victim” 
 Pawlowski contends that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to prove that he believed he was communicating 
with a minor, as required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 
2422(b).  Because Pawlowski did not preserve the issue, we 
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review for plain error.  United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 
372, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).  We “view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government and must sustain a jury‟s 
verdict if a reasonable jury believing the government‟s 
evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
government proved all the elements of the offenses.”  Id. at 
381-82 (internal quotations omitted).  The defendant‟s burden 
is “extremely high.”  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 
329 (3d Cir. 2010).     
 
 Because Pawlowski targeted an adult decoy, rather 
than an actual minor, he was charged with attempt, which 
focuses “on the subjective intent of the defendant, not the 
actual age of the victim.”  See United States v. Tykarsky, 446 
F.3d 458, 466-69 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding lack of an actual 
minor is not a defense to charge of attempted enticement).  To 
prove attempt, the government must show the defendant 
intended to commit a crime and took a substantial step toward 
doing so.  Id. at 469.  Accordingly, one of the elements the 
government must prove (and the only one that Pawlowski 
disputes on appeal) is that Pawlowski subjectively believed 
that “Ashley” was under the age of 18.     
 
 Pawlowski argues that there was insufficient evidence 
for the jury to find that he believed “Ashley” was a minor 
because “as far as he knew, and subjectively believed, the 15-
year old age could have been false, just as easily as the 98-
year old age could have been.”  We reject Pawlowski‟s 
argument because ample evidence was introduced at trial 
from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Pawlowski subjectively believed he was 
communicating with a 15-year-old.   
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C. “Sexual Contact”  
 Pawlowski contends on appeal, as he did at sentencing, 
that the two-level enhancement for “sexual contact” pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) was improperly applied because 
the touching of oneself is not the touching “of any person.”  
We review de novo the District Court‟s interpretation of 
statutory requirements, United States v. Williams, 344 F.3d 
365, 377 (3d Cir. 2003), and legal conclusions regarding the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 
113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009).      
 
 We turn first to the language of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and of the underlying statute.  United States v. 
Swan, 275 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2002).  Where the language 
is plain and unambiguous, “the sole function of the court is to 
enforce it according to its terms.”  United States v. Sherman, 
150 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1998).  The words “must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.”  Swan, 275 F.3d at 279. 
 
 The two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2G1.3(b)(4)(A) applies if “the offense involved the 
commission of a sex act or sexual contact.”  Application Note 
1 incorporates the definitions of “sexual act” and “sexual 
contact” stated in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2246(2)-(3).  “Sexual act” is 
“the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the 
genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 
years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2246(2)(D).  “Sexual contact” is “the intentional touching, 
either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, 
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an 
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intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person.”  18 U.S.C. § 2246(3).  
 
 In Pawlowski‟s view, if Congress had intended to 
include masturbation within the meaning of the statute, the 
statute would have read “of any person or of one‟s self.”  By 
contrast, the government argues that: “The definition says any 
person.  And Mr. Pawlowski is any person.”  Indeed, “any” 
means “every.”  See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d 
ed. 1989) (“In affirmative sentences [any] asserts concerning 
a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to 
which, and thus constructively of every one of them, since 
every one may in turn be taken as a representative.”).  
Pawlowski is, of course, a person and thus “of any person” 
would include him.   
 
  Moreover, turning to the statute itself, “where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  Dean v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2009); see also United 
States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It is a 
fundamental canon of statutory construction that where 
sections of a statute did not include a specific term used 
elsewhere in the statute, the drafters did not wish such a 
requirement to apply.”).  Here, therefore, Congress 
presumably intended to distinguish between “of any person” 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(3) and “of another person” in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2246(2)(D), so that “of another person” does not include 
oneself but “of any person” does.  Indeed, the language of the 
statute is unambiguous:  it is clear that “of any person”  
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includes a defendant himself and does not  require the 
touching of the victim.    
 
 Other courts of appeal have reached the same 
conclusion through similar reasoning.  The Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that “sexual contact” includes 
“the act of masturbating” because the phrase “of any person” 
applies “to all persons, including [defendant] himself.”  See 
United States v. Aldrich, 566 F.3d 976, 979 (11th Cir. 2009).  
In that case, the District Court applied a two-level 
enhancement at sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) 
after finding that the defendant‟s “masturbating for a minor 
female in front of his web camera constituted a „sexual 
contact.‟”  Id. at 978.  The defendant argued, as Pawlowski 
does here, that “because one cannot „harass‟ oneself, the 
definition of „sexual contact‟ must not include masturbation.”  
Id. at 979.  The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument, 
noting that “a defendant need only intend to „abuse, 
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify‟ in order to 
violate the statute.  That [defendant] could not do one of these 
things is immaterial so long as he could do another.”  Id.  We 
reject Pawlowski‟s argument for the same reason.  
 
 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded 
that “sexual contact” includes masturbation in a similar but 
not identical context, i.e. where the defendant caused the 
minor victim to masturbate.  See United States v. Shafer, 573 
F.3d 267, 279 (6th Cir. 2009).  The Sixth Circuit found that 
“of any person” includes oneself based on the plain statutory 
language and further noted that the legislative history does 
not suggest otherwise.  See id. at 273.      
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 In sum, because the language of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the phrase “of any person” encompasses 
“oneself.”  The District Court, therefore, correctly interpreted 
§ 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) to include masturbation as a form of 
“sexual contact” covered by the language of the section.  See 
Sherman, 150 F.3d at 313 (“Statutory interpretation usually 
begins, and often ends, with the language of the statute.”). 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  
